The EU Non-Intervention in Libya

France, Germany and diverging governmental interests

by Ole Spillner

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ole Spillner completed his Bachelor-Degree in European Studies at Maastricht University in the Netherlands. His thesis *The EU Non-Intervention in Libya: France, Germany, and Diverging Governmental Interests* analyses why the EU did not militarily intervene in Libya during the conflict in 2011. After several professional endeavours in Addis Ababa, Brussels, Berlin and Geneva, he is now in the final stages of his French-German Dual Master Degree in *Affaires Internationales* (International Security) & Political Sciences at the *Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris* (Sciences Po Paris) in France and Freie Universität Berlin. His research interest lie in the nexus of internal and external security, the role of new technologies in EU foreign policy especially the relationship between privacy and security, and the democratic control of intelligence services. Next to his studies, he works at the Foreign Policy Thinktank German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).

PICTURE

European Union Flags near European Commission
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ABSTRACT

The 2011 Libya crisis constituted a text-book scenario for EU military engagement after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. However, the EU remained militarily absent, while some EU member states preferred to intervene in a *coalition of the willing*-framework. Thus, this paper analyses why the EU did not launch a military operation during the Libya crisis in 2011. Based on a liberal theoretical perspective, this paper assumes that governments translate domestic preferences into their foreign policies. These domestic preferences are constituted by public pressure and foreign elite opinion. Drawing on newspaper analysis and document analysis of parliamentary debates in France and Germany, this paper shows that French public pressure and foreign elites' opinion favoured an intervention, while the German public and foreign policy elites' were more sceptical about EU military engagement. This paper concludes that these two countries had such fundamentally different governmental interests that reaching a timely, mutually beneficial compromise on EU military engagement in Libya was not possible.

KEY WORDS

European Union, Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), Foreign Policy, Military Intervention, Liberalism

INTRODUCTION

On 15 February 2011, the first uprising against the regime of Muammar al-Gaddafi struck Libya following the successful revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. These small protests quickly took over the whole country and large parts of the Libyan population were on the streets demonstrating against the regime. This call for more rights and freedom was met with violence by parts of the military, militias, and foreign mercenaries which were loyal to al-Gaddafi. The international community reacted quickly to the uprising and a first UNSC Resolution was passed on 26 February 2011 sanctioning the violent reply by the government and referring the case to the International Criminal Court (UNSC, 2011a). Nevertheless, the regime continued the violence against the protestors which led to the second UNSC Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011 authorising the use of "all necessary measures" and endorsing a no-fly-zone over Libya (UNSC, 2011b). Following this resolution, France, the UK, and US started a military campaign to support the protestors and ensure the resignation of the al-Gaddafi regime.

At the same time, the EU had implemented the Lisbon Treaty which targeted the EU's external performance by giving it a legal personality and operationalising the new institutional set-up with the post of HR/VP and the EEAS. These measures aimed at creating the necessary conditions for engaging more effectively and coherently in crises around the globe (DGIP, 2015). The situation in

Libya was the first security crisis the EU faced after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, and constituted a "textbook-scenario" for military EU intervention: firstly, a UNSC Resolution authorised the use of force; secondly, there was regional support by the Arab League which requested foreign forces to intervene in the conflict; and thirdly, the US publicly announced that they would not take the lead but rather expected Europe to act (Biscop, 2011). However, despite the fact that this crisis in Libya constituted an archetypical scenario for which the EU had been planning for to take the lead and engage militarily, the EU was absent (Biscop, 2011; Howorth, 2013, p. 65). Instead, several MS such as France and the UK preferred to intervene in a *coalition of the willing* outside the framework of the EU.

This thesis, thus, aims to explain why the EU did not launch a military operation[1] during the Libya crisis in 2011. It claims that differing governmental interests of the MS which are grounded in national public pressure and foreign policy elites' opinion led to disagreement between the MS. Since the launch of a military operation requires unanimity (Art. 42(4) TEU), these disagreements made a quick EU response not feasible compared to unilateral solutions.

The idea of a European army exists within the EU since the early 2000s without gaining momentum. Instead, the EU is lacking serious military capabilities and is highly dependent on NATO (Klein & Wessels, 2013).

The Libya crisis is a case in point since an intervention

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[1] The literature on EU crisis management uses the terms mission and operation interchangeably. This thesis, however, sticks to the distinction by the EEAS in which mission is used for civilian crisis management and operation is used for military crisis management.

was conducted outside the EU framework. In addition, the Defence Ministers of the MS are currently discussing a new military pact of the EU which, among other things, could allow non-MS such as the post-Brexit UK to participate in common military operations (Barigazzi, 2018). Consequently, the societal relevance of this thesis lies in providing explanations about the failure to deploy a military operation that could implicate what is hindering the EU to become a coercive power. Furthermore, the thesis could implicate which obstacles the EU needs to overcome to deepen its military integration and even expand its framework to include non-MS, and thus, contribute to current societal debates.

Firstly, this thesis places the puzzle in the broader academic debate. Secondly, the thesis presents liberalism as the guiding analytical framework followed by the methodology. This framework assumes that governmental interest, which is shaped by public pressure and foreign elite opinions, determines foreign policy outcomes. Consequently, in the analysis public pressure and foreign policy elites' opinion of France and Germany are analysed. The focus lays on these two countries because they were the MS dominating the debate within the EU. Lastly, a conclusion synthesises the findings.

LITERATUR REVIEW

The CFSP is the result of a rapidly shifting security environment after the end of the Cold War (Gross & Juncos, 2011). The very nature of CFSP is intergovernmental, providing the MS with the leading role in this policy field (Mayer, 2013; Gegout, 2010). This intergovernmental nature depicts itself in several ways. Firstly, all decisions are taken by unanimity and solely by the MS. Secondly, CFSP is the only EU policy area in which the MS have a right of initiative. Lastly, all MS are retaining their own independent foreign policy to pursue national foreign policies in addition to the CFSP (Gegout, 2010).

In 2000, the European Council established the CSDP[2] as part of CFSP as "a manifestation of the long-debated idea" to provide the EU with robust conflict prevention and crisis management capabilities (Petrov, 2011). There are two contrasting views that account for the emergence of CSDP. Intergovernmentalists argue that the MS and the Big Three (France, Germany, UK) in particular have been the main actors in the establishment of CSDP since they decided during several intergovernmental summits to advance the CFSP to include security and defence mechanisms (Bickerton, Hodson & Puetter, 2015; Howorth, 2004; Juncos, 2011; Lindley-French, 2002; Pavlov, 2015; Smith, 2015). Neo-functionalists, however, contend that the constant expansion of responsibilities and expertise of the EU institutions leads to more expansion of responsibilities (spillover-effect) and CSDP was, consequently, the result of this spillover (Dijkstra, 2013;

Petrov, 2011).

The establishment of CSDP provided the EU with the possibility to deploy civilian and military forces for managing international crises (Howorth, 2017; Portela & Ruffa, 2015; Tercovich, 2014). Since the deployment of the first crisis management mission in 2003, EU crisis management missions and operations have been launched with increasing frequency and geographic scope (Gross & Juncos, 2011). Whereas the initial aim of CSDP was to embrace coercive, military power (Howorth, 2017), CSDP has mostly developed on the civilian side (Ejdus, 2017; Faleg, 2017; Portela & Ruffa, 2015). Consequently, the majority of missions have been of civilian nature deploying civilian staff such as police or legal and policy experts to monitor, advise, or train local forces (Chivvis, Rand Cooperation, National Defense Research Institute & United States Department of Defense, 2010; Gross, 2011).

While the establishment of CSDP is highly contested, the reasoning behind the actual deployment of military operations is similarly contested. There are three competing approaches in academia which aim at explaining the process of launching or not launching an EU crisis management operation: Realism, Institutionalism and Liberalism. From a realist point of view, the deployment of military EU operations can be best understood from the perspective of power, national interests, and prestige (Gegout, 2009; Kissinger, 1994; Waltz, 1979). In the past, MS promoted their national prestige by participating in transatlantic operations. However, today they increase their prestige by proving the existence and efficacy of the EU as a viable unitary and proactive international actor who acts independently from the US. Consequently, the deployment of CSDP operations depends on its potential to increase the prestige of MS (Gegout, 2009; Nováky, 2015). From an institutionalist point of view, it is argued that the EU institutions are at the heart of the CSDP machinery because they have informational advantages over the MS in terms of process expertise, knowledge in the state-of-play of policy-making and the preferences of all involved actors. Thus, CSDP operations are deployed if the EU institutions and EU officials use their informational advantage to steer the discussion towards a crisis management operation (Dijkstra, 2013).

Thirdly, Liberals contest that it is not national interest driving the deployment of military operations but rather governmental considerations. Governmental interests are driven less by external factors such as in realism or institutionalism but rather by domestic constraints and opportunities. Since the domestic support for the government depends on the perceived legitimacy and competence with which it handles foreign affairs, it has two incentives to participate in CSDP crisis management: Foremost, it might receive political benefit by demon-

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[2] Before the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, CSDP was called European Defence and Security Policy. For reasons of consistency, this thesis uses the term CSDP also for the time before the Lisbon Treaty.

strating that it is capable of influencing international events. Secondly, it might receive domestic penalties if the people perceive foreign policy projects as too expensive or too risky. Therefore, liberal scholars argue that CSDP operation deployment depends on MS societal preferences expressed by the media and foreign policy elites (Moravcsik, 2008; Pohl, 2013; Pohl, 2014b).

To account for this non-intervention, the realist framework does not seem to fit. Since the US publicly announced that they would not be willing to act it was a chance for the EU to take the lead, show its independence from the US and act as a coercive power (Klein & Wessels, 2013; Koenig, 2011). However, the EU did not grab this chance to increase its prestige with a military intervention, a behaviour that a realist framework cannot account for. Furthermore, during the Libya crisis the newly established EEAS and HR/VP were still in the process of being set-up, and thus, not yet able to play any role (Koenig, 2011; Koenig, 2014). Furthermore, Dijkstra (2013) acknowledges that the institutional role in CSDP predominantly exists for civilian missions and its influence on military operations is only marginal. Thus, the institutionalist approach does not seem to explain the EU's non-intervention either. According to Portela & Ruffa (2015), the main obstacles to CSDP cooperation are differences in ideology and interests of governments. Consequently, this paper uses the liberal approach since this is the only approach that considers these differences in governmental interest.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The thesis will approach the question of non-intervention in Libya from a liberal perspective. The liberal school of thought distinguishes itself from the other grand theories of international relations by assuming that states do not have the same goals and behaviours internationally. Instead, liberalism assumes that the national characteristics of states matter for their international relations, which makes liberalism "a more complex and less cohesive" body of theory (Slaughter, 2011). Moravcsik (1997) mainstreamed this diverse body of theory into a more general liberal theory of international relations based on the premise that state behaviour is the result of its preferences that derive from domestic and transnational social pressures (p. 516). Revolved around this premise, liberalism is based on three core assumptions: Firstly, individuals and private groups, not states, are the main actors in international politics, and thus, international politics rest on a bottom-up approach. Secondly, states represent the dominant subset of the domestic society and its interest. Since the State is domestically a representative institution, its preferences reflect shifting domestic demands, and thus, it acts as critical transmission belt by which the preferences of individuals are translated into foreign policy. "Deriving State preferences from social preferences is thus a central [...] task of liberal theory" (Moravcsik, 2008, p. 236). Thirdly, the

pattern of interdependence among state preferences shapes state behaviour. This means that if policy externalities remain low, unilateral actions remain optimal for most states. However, if policy alignment can generate mutual gains, there is an incentive for international policy coordination or convergence (Moravcsik, 1997; Moravcsik, 2008).

Based on these theoretical assumptions, Pohl (2014b) has developed an approach which is particularly well-suited to guide the analysis of EU non-operations. This model focuses on governmental interest, not on national interests. At the heart of democratic governments remains the wish to stay in office and be re-elected. In order to achieve this goal, governments need to be perceived as legitimate and competent in dealing with foreign affairs by translating domestic preferences into their foreign policy. Consequently, the governmental interest is derived from the societal preferences. Regarding the participation in CSDP operations, there are two main considerations for a government. Firstly, governments can domestically benefit by showing their constituency that they are able to influence international affairs in line with domestic preferences by participating in a CSDP operation. Secondly, they run a risk of being perceived as paying a too high price for an operation whose benefits are not clear (Pohl, 2014b, p. 193).

The mechanism that eventually ensures that governments take domestic preferences into account when deciding on the participation on a CSDP operation is twofold. Firstly, there is an incentive for governments to participate in CSDP operations if they are faced with strong public pressure. Public pressure expresses itself when public opinion on a certain topic is voiced so loudly via continuous and strong media coverage that the government takes notice of it (Meyer, 2006; Robinson, 2001; Pohl, 2014b). Since the government translates domestic preferences into its foreign policy, it generally aims at following the public pressure. However, governments are not only monitored by the general public but also by foreign policy elites. These foreign policy elites are actors involved in the foreign policy process that serve as a transmission belt between the government and public pressure i.e. MPs. Consequently, the government can be called out by these elites if it simply follows the public opinion although it might not be beneficial for the country. Therefore, the government aims at also being perceived as competent by these elites. The foreign policy elite opinion, thus, is the second part of that (Pohl, 2014b).

Regarding the participation in EU military operations, governments need to balance between excessive risk-taking and being inactive. Both considerations are weighted differently in each country depending on geographic, social, and historical factors. Thus, actions of governments might lack a strategic logic because of their focus on satisfying the domestic audience while avoiding blame by foreign policy elites. As a result from this ex-

pectation, it can be assumed that disagreement between the MS in regard to the deployment of a CSDP operation can be explained by diverging domestic political priorities. This disagreement makes it difficult to agree on a policy coordination i.e. a common military operation. Consequently, MS are expected to prefer unilateral solutions which ultimately result in a non-operation of the EU (Pohl, 2014b).

OPERATIONALISING PUBLIC PRESSURE

This thesis uses a two-fold approach to operationalise the variable of public pressure by looking at the media coverage and opinion polls on the topic of the crisis in Libya. According to Robinson (2001) and Pohl (2014b), media coverage of a topic is a suitable indicator of public pressure. "Mediatized conflagrations" indicate public pressure and represent public opinion (Hansen, Cottle, Negrine & Newbold, 1998, p. 92; Macnamara, 2005, p. 1; Pohl, 2014b). To determine the media coverage that indicates and builds public pressure, this thesis analyses newspaper articles. Newspapers are the most diverse form of media since they include reports, commentaries, official statements and opinion pages. This diversity makes newspapers a comprehensive source of the public debate, and thus, a highly significant source. Furthermore, newspapers can be considered as one of the most important tools to build public pressure (Bucher, Engel, Harfensteller, & Dijkstra, 2013). It could be argued that newspaper articles are not necessarily representative of the entire public opinion but may potentially still reflect only a partial public opinion. Therefore, this thesis compares and triangulates the results of the newspaper analysis with representative public opinion polls on military intervention in Libya.

OPERATIONALISING FOREIGN POLICY ELITES' OPINION

Foreign policy elites are shaped by the national strategic culture (Greathouse, 2010). Therefore, this thesis analyses the foreign elites' opinion along the lines of the respective national strategic culture. The thesis focuses on the opinion of German and French MPs. These foreign policy elites represent opinions from the whole range of the political spectrum. Furthermore, the foreign policy elites in the parliaments have direct access to the government during parliamentary debates. This practice ensures that the opinion of foreign policy elites is de facto heard by the government, since MPs are the foreign policy elites with the easiest and most regular access to the government (Andeweg & Nijzink, 1995). Their opinion will be assessed by manually categorising their arguments along the lines of the national strategic culture.

CASE AND SAMPLE SELECTION

This thesis conducts a single case study of the military non-intervention of the EU in the Libya crisis in 2011 since this case provided the EU with the first security crisis after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. Fur-

thermore, this case is especially interesting since it presented itself as an archetypical scenario for a military involvement of the EU after the establishment of the Lisbon Treaty: A UNSC resolution authorised the use of force, there was regional support by the Arab League, and the US refused to take the lead (Biscop, 2011). Nevertheless, the EU did not agree on a military operation. In 2011, the EU consisted of 27 MS. Since it is outside the scope of this thesis to analyse the governmental interests of all 27 MS, the thesis focuses on France and Germany. In the analysis of CSDP, France and Germany are the obvious choice since both countries represent the different views on CSDP in the EU (Howorth, 2013; Pohl, 2014a). There are also case-related reasons to focus on these two countries, since both were leading one of the camps in the EU in favour or against a military EU operation (Bucher et al., 2013). This thesis does not analyse the governmental interests of the UK, the third obvious choice. While the UK was generally in favour of a military intervention, they did not steer the discussion within the EU but rather focused their efforts on NATO and the UN (Koenig, 2014). Consequently, they left the lead within the EU to France and aligned behind France in the EU (Bucher et al., 2013; Pannier & Schmitt, 2014).

DATA COLLECTION OF PUBLIC PRESSURE

This thesis analyses four different newspapers: two German (*Die Welt* & *Frankfurter Rundschau*) and two French (*Le Figaro* & *Le Monde*). These newspapers were chosen based on several criteria: Firstly, from both countries a centre-left and a centre-right newspaper was chosen to represent both sides of the political spectrum. Secondly, these newspapers were chosen because they extensively deal with national and international politics. Lastly, they are among the most circulated newspapers in both countries. The articles were retrieved from the *Lexisnexis academic* database. The used timeframe was 15 February 2011 to 19 March 2011, and thus, included all articles published between the start of the unrest in Libya until the day France, UK and the US launched their military intervention. The articles were found using the keyword Libya (in French: *Libye*; in German: *Libyen*). The initial result were 1051 newspaper articles, 634 French articles (*Le Figaro*: 304 articles; *Le Monde*: 330 articles) and 417 German articles (*Die Welt*: 210 articles; *Frankfurter Rundschau*: 207 articles). From this initial sample, the articles covering the crisis in Libya were manually selected since machine coding across languages is not reliable (Macnamara, 2005).

This selection concluded in 319 French and 219 German articles covering the topic in different formats such as reports, commentaries, opinion pages and interviews. In the second step, the newspapers were analysed qualitatively. The articles were manually categorised based on whether they were dealing with arguments of military involvement. These 300 selected articles (France: 170 articles; Germany: 130 articles) were coded according to

whether they presented largely pro, neutral, or contra arguments about military intervention in Libya (for list of arguments see Table 1).

DATACOLLECTION: FOREIGN POLICY ELITES' OPINION

This thesis conducts a document analysis of the officially published parliamentary debate transcripts for determining the opinion of the foreign policy elites. In the case of the German *Bundestag*, two debates, on the 16 March 2011 and 18 March 2011, are analysed. The verified transcripts were retrieved from the *Bundestag* website. In both debates, the MPs discussed a German participation in a military intervention in Libya. Accumulated, the speeches of 6 CDU/CSU, 4 SPD, 3 FDP, 2 Grüne, and 3 Linke MPs are analysed, thus, encompassing the whole political spectrum from the centre-right to the left.

In the French case, the debate of the *Assemblée Nationale* of 22 March 2011 is analysed. The officially verified transcript was retrieved from the *Journal Officiel*. While the debate was held the day after the start of the intervention, it has been the only debate in the French parliament about a military intervention. In total, the speeches of 3 UMP, and 1 SRC, GDR, NC and NI MP respectively are analysed. Overall, the opinion of the foreign policy elites represents the whole political spectrum from right to far left.

PUBLIC PRESSURE IN FRANCE AND GERMANY

Figure 1 shows the weekly article output of the analysed newspapers on the situation in Libya in 2011 from CW 7 to 11 in France (grey line) and Germany (black line), as well as the trend of
publication output in both countries. It can be observed that the general coverage of the issue in the French and German media follows the same trend peaking around the Security Council Resolutions in CW 8 and 10. It can also be observed that the general coverage has been larger in the French media compared to the German media. In the indicated time period, the French media published 100 more articles about the developments in Libya compared to the German media. While at the beginning of the uprisings in Libya (CW 7) the media coverage was almost similar, the gap continuously widened.

Based on the assumption that high media attention indicates public pressure for governments, it can be concluded that the public pressure to act in France had been higher than in Germany because the topic was quantitatively more present in the media. Nevertheless, the topic was also present in the German public debate, and thus, it seems that decision-makers in both countries perceived the topic as pressing for the public. Since this quantitative analysis is not conclusive regarding the direction of the public pressure i.e. if pressure built up towards or against an intervention, the following part of the analysis examines the arguments of the media qualitatively.

Figure 2 shows the development and relative distribution of arguments towards military intervention in the French and German media (for the arguments see Table 1). In CW 7, none of the four newspapers presented arguments on military intervention. Examining the distribution in


Figure 1: Coverage of Crisis in Libya by French and German Media

the French media, it can be observed that in CW 8, the arguments towards intervention were balanced with 48.3% neutral articles. However, towards the second UNSC Resolution 1973 (CW 11), articles in favour of military intervention were increasingly published cumulating in CW 11 in 63.5% of the articles being in favour of and only 15.4% against a military intervention. Furthermore, it can be observed that the minority of articles opposed a

against a military intervention. The French media presented only two main arguments against an intervention while the German newspapers mentioned nine. These results resemble the previous part of the analysis in which it could already be concluded that the debate in Germany has been more diverse and revolved less around one direction of arguments. This is confirmed by the actual arguments.


Figure 2: French and German Press on Military Intervention

mili-
tary
intervention. The opposing articles ranged from 34.2% to 15.4%, while the pro articles ranged from 34.4% to 63.5%.

In the German media no clear trend regarding the argumentation about a military intervention is visible. In CW 8, most articles are neutral. In CW 9 and CW 10, this changes towards most articles presenting arguments against a military intervention. However, in CW 11, this trend is circumvented and more arguments in favour of a military intervention are presented, with the majority of articles being neutral. Moreover, there are fewer articles published in favour of a military intervention ranging only from 9.5% to 29.5%, while the articles presenting arguments against a military intervention ranged from 13.3% to 50%. Compared to the French articles, the German media approached the topic of military intervention rather critically with a minority of articles supporting a military intervention.

After examining the distribution of arguments, this part of the thesis examines the actual arguments. The most used arguments were collected and sorted into Pro and Contra military intervention (see Table 1). An argument was considered as present in the public debate if it was mentioned in both analysed national newspapers. In total six arguments in favour of an intervention, and nine arguments against a military intervention were identified.

Examining the arguments used in the French and German media, two observations can be made. Firstly, it can be noted that the arguments in favour of an intervention are almost the same in Germany and France. However, the German media presented more diverse arguments

To confirm the representativeness of the results, these results are triangulated with public opinion polls which asked the population on their stance regarding a military intervention in Libya. The German opinion research institute *EMNID* conducted on the 18 May 2011 a survey among 501 German citizens for the newspaper *Bild am Sonntag*. While the exact method is not indicated, *EMNID* argues on its website that it conducts its research according to academic standards. Furthermore, it is shown that the interviewees are selected at random, ensuring that they are representative of the German population (EMNID, 2018). In this survey 65% of the German citizens stated that they were against a German participation in the military intervention, while only 29% were in favour (Die Welt, 2011).

In France, the opinion research institute *IFOP* conducted a similar representative survey among French citizens between the 21 March 2011 and 22 March 2011. The survey was conducted by *IFOP* for the newspaper *France Soir.* The survey was conducted among 1000 participants above the age of 18. The representativeness of the survey was ensured by a quota method (sex, age, and profession of interviewee) after stratification by region and agglomeration. In this survey, 66% of the French citizens favoured a military intervention while only 34% disagreed on it (IFOP, 2011). Both results of the German and French opinion polls indicate a similar trend to the newspaper analysis. French population was rather in favour of a military intervention, while the German population was rather against it. Thus, one can conclude that the newspaper articles were representative of the public opinion. Furthermore, in both cases, the research results

Arguments Pro Intervention	France	Germany
Protection of Human Rights / Responsibility to Protect	x	x
Economic Reasons (e.g. access to oil)	x	x
Support Rebels and built democratic structures	x	x
Build democratic structures	x	x
Rebuilt EU creditlity	x	x
Refugees (i.e. ensure that they do not have to flee the country anymore)	x	x
Special relations with region	x	
Arguments Contra Intervention	**France**	**Germany**
Rebels have no legitimacy		x
Sovereignty of Libya		x
Other means (e.g. sanctions) are more effective	x	x
Need for regional solutions		x
Anti-western sentiments		x
Civilian Casualties		x
Longterm military Commitment	x	x
Previous experiences with military interventions in the Middle East		x
Contradicting / unclear position of Arab League		x
Success unclear / Failed-State Scenario which could result in a refugees influx		x
Too risky / death of own nationals		x

Table 1: Arguments Pro / Contra Intervention

show the same trend as in the similar research conducted by Bucher et al. (2013).

It can be concluded that the topic of the crisis in Libya made headlines in both countries, and thus, based on the liberal assumption that media attention indicates public pressure, public pressure increased for both governments. Moreover, the analysis demonstrated that the French newspapers mainly reported about arguments in favour of a military intervention. This trend was also confirmed by looking at the arguments themselves, since the arguments against an intervention were less diverse than those in favour. The German newspapers, however, had a more diverse discussion on an intervention with a slight preference towards neutral or contra arguments. Moreover, the German newspapers used a more diverse argumentation presenting more arguments. Based on the assumption that high media attention indicates public pressure for the government to act, it can be concluded that in France the public pressure clearly pointed towards a military intervention. In the German case, there is not such a clear tendency of the public pressure, however, it rather points towards no intervention.

FRENCH AND GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY ELITES' OPINION
STRATEGIC CULTURES

Foreign policy elites' opinion is shaped along their national strategic culture (Greathouse, 2010; Pohl, 2014b). Therefore, the foreign policy elites' opinions have to be analysed in the light of the differing strategic cultures of France and Germany. Strategic culture can be defined as a "body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force" which are held by a nation which arises gradually over time through a unique historical process

(Longhurst & Zaborowski, 2013, p. 89). Strategic culture is persistent over time, although it is not a static feature since it can be shaped and altered by formative periods or events (Miskimmon, 2007). Consequently, the historic evolution of a country's view on the use of force has to be considered.

GERMAN ELITES: AVERSION AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE?

The key to understand Germany's strategic culture is the aftermath of the Second World War (Meyer, 2006). In this period, Germany had two overarching goals: reconciliation with its enemies, and gaining acceptance as a legitimate actor on the world stage. Since the other European countries feared a reinvigorated Germany, this task was only achievable within a multilateral framework which contained independent German action. Consequently, Germany defined its foreign policy aims along the lines of NATO and European integration to reconcile with its former enemies (Belkin, 2009). Following the *nie-wieder* doctrine, Germany established an aversion to the use of force. This was reflected in the German constitution which explicitly prohibited the deployment of military troops abroad (Belkin, 2009; Miskimmon, 2007). With the decision of the *Verfassungsgericht* in 1994 to allow the deployment of the *Bundeswehr* abroad, Germany slightly moved away from its principal refusal on the use of force (Miskimmon, 2007). Following this historical evolution, Germany's stance on the use of force is thus defined by a general aversion depicted by a narrow scope of legitimate goals which justify the use of force, a narrow risk tolerance, high parliamentarian authorisation requirements, and a strong embedding in a multilateral framework (Gross, 2009; Meyer, 2006). Consequently, it is expected

that the German foreign policy elites build their opinion based on an assessment of whether a military intervention is legitimate and if it entails risks.

At the time of the two *Bundestag* debates, Germany was governed by a centre-right coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP facing a centre-left opposition of SPD, Grüne and Linke. There was broad consensus between the government and the opposition on rejecting a military intervention in Libya. This came as surprise, since usually one can observe a broad divergence between the centre-left and centre-right forces regarding foreign and defence policy (Pappi, Stoffel, & Seher, 2009). Only the SPD did not share the explicit refusal on any military participation but had a more diverse stance on the topic.

Speakers from all political parties stated arguments based on the potential risk that a military operation entailed. Gloser (SPD), Götzer (CDU/CSU) and Künast (Grünen) pointed towards the fact that a military intervention contained many risks (Bundestag, 2011a, pp. 10828-10830; Bundestag, 2011b, p. 11150). This argument was further elaborated by several other MPs. Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) pointed out that al-Gaddafi does not only have air forces but also ground forces. To accommodate for this condition, the deployment of ground forces would be required to support the air force (p. 10820). Furthermore, Stinner (FDP) and Götzer (CDU/CSU) pointed out that the chaotic situation in Libya could quickly expand to a long-lasting engagement of German ground forces in a civil war without a possibility to exit (Bundestag, 2011a, p. 10823; Bundestag, 2011b, p. 11152). This was further elaborated by Gehrke (Linke) who referred to the Iraq-War and the lessons that could be drawn from the latest unsuccessful military deployments in the Middle East which resulted in long-term military commitments for Germany (Bundestag, 2011a, p. 10822).

In the second line of argumentation, MPs from the entire political spectrum questioned the legitimacy of a military intervention. As Mützenich (SPD) pointed out, the UNSC resolution was based on decision by the Arab League which called for foreign intervention. However, this decision was not taken by unanimity, but instead three members of the Arab League rejected the decision (Bundestag, 2011a, p. 10819). Furthermore, as Schockenhoff (CDU/CSU) and Stinner (FDP) explained, the Arab League asked for a military intervention without stationing foreign troops which is a contradiction in terms (pp. 10820-10824). The legitimacy was further questioned by van Aken (Linke) and Götzer (CDU/CSU) who claimed that the intervention would only lead to civilian causalities (Bundestag, 2011b, pp. 11145-11152). This argument was further elaborated by Götzer (CDU/CSU) who argued that a military intervention would even be counterproductive to the aims since it would undermine democratic processes and could lead to anti-western sentiments (Bundestag, 2011a, p. 10831). Only the SPD MPs argued

that a military intervention would be legitimate under the *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine which is defined in the UN Charter (Bundestag, 2011a, p. 10819; Bundestag, 2011b, p. 11145). Künast (Grüne) and Liebich (Linke), however, rejected this argumentation by arguing that this would only apply to cases of ethnic cleansing or genocide which was not the case in Libya (Bundestag, 2011b, p. 11151).

The presented arguments by the German foreign policy elites focused on an assessment of risk and legitimacy. They represented the hesitance of the elites to accept the use of force and to put strict limitations on it. MPs from all political parties agreed that a military intervention would contain major risks and the outcome would be unpredictable. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the military intervention was questioned. MPs from both governmental and opposition parties agreed that the military intervention was built on a weak foundation especially due to the unclear position of the Arab League. Only the SPD MPs did not question the legitimacy of a military intervention arguing it was rooted in the UN framework. Overall, a clear trend to question a German military participation among the German foreign policy elites was identifiable. All MPs explicitly stated that they are strictly against a participation with the exception of the SPD MPs. Therefore, one can conclude that the foreign policy elites' opinion clearly indicated a refusal of German participation in a military intervention in Libya.

FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY ELITES: FORCE TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS?

The strategic culture of France can be traced back to the time of the French Revolution in the 18th century. The establishment of universal values in the *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen de 1789* established France as the most progressive and global power of the time and led to a self-perception of being *grandeur* (Treacher, 2000). Consequently, France perceived itself as the protector of these universal values who would spread and defend them by any means including force. Furthermore, it became France's primary foreign policy goal to retain its elevated position in the world (Keiger, 2001; Treacher, 2000). Until the end of the Cold War, this meant that France understood itself as unilateral military actor (Hyde-Price, 2004; Mérand, 2003). However, in the Post-Cold War order France feared marginalisation due to its comparatively small army. Consequently, its position evolved towards favouring multilateral approaches (Treacher, 2000; Vennesson, 2003). Therefore, France's strategic culture can be described as consisting of a high willingness to deploy force if human rights and rule of law are threatened even if it entails high risks. Furthermore, it is marked by a high dependency on multilateral frameworks such as a UNSC resolution (Meyer, 2006; Tardy, 2014). Consequently, it can be expected that the French foreign policy elites built their opinion based on

an assessment of whether a military intervention promotes human rights, if it leads to an increase of international prestige, and if it is embedded in a multilateral framework.

During the parliamentary session of the *Assemblée Nationale*, the absolute majority of seats were taken by the centre-right UMP who also provided the president. During the debate about an intervention in Libya, broad agreement on favouring a military intervention between the governmental and position parties could be observed. Only the far-left GDR presented arguments against an intervention (AN, 2011).

MPs from all political parties addressed the issue of the protection of human rights recognising that basic human rights have been infringed in Libya. Jacob (UMP) and Ayrault (SRC) stated that Libya is violating the universal rights that France associates itself with (AN, 2011, p. 1882). This argument was further specified by Ayrault (SRC), Jacob (UMP), Sauvadet (NC), and Teissier (UMP) who argued that al-Gaddafi was killing civilians (pp.1881-1889). All of the above mentioned speakers agreed that it is France's role and responsibility to protect these universal values. Furthermore, Ayrault (SRC) argued that no action from the French would result in indicating to dictators that they did not have to fear consequences for human rights violations (p. 1880). Moreover, Muselier (UMP) stated that the French history obliged it to support any kind of civil society that wants to establish democracy (p. 1888). Consequently, Ayrault (SRC), Jacob (UMP), Sauvadet (NC), Bayron (NI), Teissier (UMP), and Muselier (UMP) concluded that a military intervention would be legitimate (pp. 1882-1890). Only Muzeau (GDR) did not agree with this conclusion. Instead he argued that military action would not be legitimate in the first place, and secondly, it would not protect universal rights but rather infringe them further since more civilians would be harmed (pp. 1883-1885).

Several speakers addressed the issue of embedding the operation in a multilateral framework. Ayrault (SRC) stated that the operation is indeed embedded in a multilateral framework, however, this would not even be required because it is not a long-term war commitment (p. 1880). Jacob (UMP) supported this argument by referring to the consent of regional actors such as the Arab League and the Libyan population which embraced foreign military action. Furthermore, he argued that some Arabic states would support the intervention in a multilateral approach (pp. 1882-1883). These arguments were criticised by Muzeau (GDR) who argued that the intervention is based on the wrong assumption that the international community backed this intervention. Especially the BRICS and Arab countries would refuse the interpretation of the USNC resolution as a *carte blanche* for Western military intervention (pp. 1883-1885).

According to Teissier (UMP), an intervention in France would give France the possibility to show its importance in the world and gain prestige (p. 1890). Ayrault (SRC) and Jacob (UMP) support this argument by stating that France had an obligation to act on the UNSC resolution. This would be expected by the world and a no-action would cost France international prestige (pp. 1881-1883). Muzeau (GDR) objected to these claims. He argued that a military intervention had no implications for the French international prestige because the US was in the lead and France only their vassal (p. 1884).

The arguments of the French foreign policy elites clearly indicated that a majority supported the military intervention and the leading role France took. It is clearly emphasised that the al-Gaddafi regime is violating human rights and that it is the French responsibly to protect these. Furthermore, it is indicated that this could bring France international prestige. Only the far-left speaker argued against a military intervention since it would not result in more prestige but rather lead to more causalities instead of protection of human rights. However, with these views he remained isolated, since all other present foreign policy elites argued strongly in favour of this intervention.

Discussion: Diverging Governmental interests?

This section brings together the two parts of the analysis and determines the reasons why the EU has not launched a military operation in Libya. As shown above, the French government perceived public pressure which mainly indicated the public demand for a military operation. Following the liberal theory, the French government had to decide if it wanted to act in accordance with this public pressure or resist the public pressure by weighting the public pressure against the foreign policy elite opinion. However, the vast majority of foreign policy experts except the GDR-speakers were in favour of such a military intervention in Libya. Thus, there was no reason for the French government to resist the public pressure, and it was in its governmental interest to intervene in Libya.

The German government perceived a similar public pressure towards the Libya crisis. However, in its case it was not as clear cut in favour of an intervention, but it rather indicated a rejection of the idea of a Germany participation in a military intervention by the German population. Similarly to the French situation, the German foreign policy elites shared the public opinion. With the exception of the SPD-speakers they were rather critical towards German military participation and demanded the German troops not to participate. Therefore, it was in the German governments interest to not resist the public pressure but rather follow it and not participate militarily.

According to Art. 42(4) TEU, the decision to deploy a EU military operation requires unanimity in the Consilium. Based on the liberal school of thought, to achieve this policy coordination, the decision must be perceived as

beneficial for all involved parties. However, if this is not the case unilateral decisions remain the norm (Moravcsik, 1997; Moravcsik, 2008). Following from the analysis we can see that the German and the French governments had fundamentally different interests. While the French government was pressured by the public and elites into actively engaging with its military in Libya, the German public and elites preferred the German government to remain neutral. Consequently, creating a common policy which creates mutual benefits seemed highly unlikely since the interests of the governments were so inherently different that either decision was against one of the governments interest, and thus, not beneficial. As a result, both governments' interest was to act unilaterally pursuing actions in line with their national interests. Therefore, this research shows that the EU did not launch a military operation during the Libya crisis in 2011 because the governmental interests of its MS were too different to make policy coordination mutually beneficial.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined the question of why the EU did not launch a military operation during the Libya crisis in 2011. Drawing on newspaper analysis and document analysis of parliamentary debates in France and Germany, this paper concludes that these two countries had such fundamentally different governmental interests that reaching a mutual beneficial compromise was not possible. Since a military operation requires unanimity in the Consilium, the diverging government interest led to not finding agreement on a deployment.

In order to determine these two governmental interests, the thesis assessed the public pressure and foreign policy elite opinion on which the governmental interests are built. The analysis of public pressure has demonstrated that the topic of the Libya crisis has been present in the public debate in both countries, however, clear differences in the actual argumentation in the public debate were revealed. As the analysis has shown, the French public debate almost exclusively focused on arguments in favour of a military intervention. As opposed to the French public debate, the German public debate was more diversified since arguments both in favour and against a military intervention were brought up. Consequently, this paper demonstrated that in France the public pressure for the government indicated public demand for a military operation, while in Germany the public pressure indicated a rejection of a military deployment.

Governments do not have an incentive to simply follow public pressure. Instead, they weight public pressure against foreign policy elites' opinion to arrive at their governmental interest. The analyses of the parliamentary debates have demonstrated that both foreign policy elites shared the domestic public opinion. In the French parliamentary debate almost all foreign policy elites were

in favour of a military intervention with the exception of the far-left speakers of the GDR. The analysis revealed that the arguments of these elites revolved around its strategic culture of obligation to defend human rights and the rule of law, France's multilateral obligations and its prestige. The German foreign policy elites, however, rejected any military action in Libya with the exception of the SPD. Instead they questioned the legitimacy and the embedding in the multilateral framework of an intervention and pointed out the entailed risks.

Based on these findings, the thesis concluded that France and Germany had diverging governmental interest which made policy convergence not mutual beneficial. Consequently, the implementation of a unilateral action outside the EU framework was perceived as the better solution for both countries. This resulted in France intervening in Libya, and Germany not deploying its military forces.

Undoubtedly, this research has limitations. Firstly, it has to be contested that the paper used sources in French and German while being written in English. Since all translations imply an interpretation, other researchers might understand these sources differently. Furthermore, these thesis regards foreign policy elites as a transmission belt between public pressure and the government. However, they are not completely isolated from public opinion and pressure. However, this simplification of social reality is necessary since an in-depth determination of the extent of public influence on foreign policy elites would be outside the scope of this paper.

Several implications can be drawn from this research. It can be contested that the future military integration which might even result in a European army still needs further discussion among the decision-makers of the MS. The diverging interests of MS need to be dismantled before further military integration can become a concrete reality. Furthermore, the prospect of opening EU military operations to external states is most likely to provide difficulties. The demonstrated divergence in governmental interests already among the MS show the difficulty to create mutual interests with non-MS that allows for temporal integration of these states for certain EU military operations.

Lastly, this paper paves the floor for future research. Since it analysed only one case of a military non-intervention, research on other non-interventions such as in the Ukraine case should be conducted to determine a broader trend of after-Lisbon military (non)action of the EU. Furthermore, only two countries' governmental interest were analysed. Thus, it is suggested that future research should go into the interest of the other MS.

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